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INTRODUCTION
To what extent the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 usurped
forever the right of employers to make their own decisions concerning
any subject matter which might fall within the broad area of "rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment" if
their employees had designated a union to represent them, is one of the
most important questions which the National Labor Relations Board
(herein called the Board) has been called upon to answer during the
past 20 years.
The Wagner Act1 declared it to be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9 (a)." (section 8 (a) (5)). Section 9 (a) defined representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining.' During the early Wagner Act
days, when it was occupied for the most part with establishing the con-
stitutionality of the Act and the scope of its control over interstate com-
merce in the areas assigned to it, the Board was not presented with many
of the more complex problems concerning the interpretation of section
8 (5) of the Act and its effect on our economy which subsequently arose.
In these early days employers frankly refused to bargain with unions on
many occasions, relying on the alleged lack of authority in the Board
to compel them to do so because of constitutional or jurisdictional obstacles.
Thereafter, from 1937, when the first cases were determined by the
Supreme Court involving the constitutionality and the scope of the
meaning of interstate commerce under the Act, the Board was confronted
primarily by two problems in connection with its obligation to compel
bargaining on the part of an employer whose employees were represented
by a union under the Act's provisions: (1) what conduct on the part of
employers constituted refusal to bargain and (2) what subjects were
included within the scope of collective bargaining. The development of
the Board's decisional policy in regard to these subjects has been given
extensive consideration by many writers. It would serve no useful purpose
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Louis and Philadelphia Regional Offices, N.L.R.B.; Chairman, National Enforce-
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1 National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449; 29 U.S.C. §151, §§151-(1935).
2 Section 9(a) provided: "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer."
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to repeat here the developments of these two aspects of the Board's
decisional law. Suffice it to say that by 1947 when the so-called Taft-
Hartley Act was passed,' the Board had fairly well established doctrines
concerning both what conduct on the part of employer, was required to
meet the provisions of section 8 (5) of the Wagner Act and what subjects
were included in that obligation.
The Taft-Hartley amendments, despite statutory changes such as
the inclusion of the definition of bargaining in section 8 (d) 4 and the
imposition of the collateral obligation to bargain on the part of a union
representing the majority of the employees in section 8 (b) (3),5 compelled
no substantial immediate changes in the doctrines established in either of
these decisional areas.
However, throughout the 112 volumes of reported decisions which
the Board has issued since 1935 there have appeared certain decisional
variations in some doctrines which go to the heart of the obligation of
employers and unions to 'bargain under the Act. It is the purpose of this
paper to discuss the present Board's thinking, as revealed in its current
decisions, in regard to some of these important doctrines, against the back-
ground of prior determinations on the same subjects.' This approach may
reveal what service, if any, the federal controls imposed by the Act on
management and labor have rendered in this significant field of our
economy, controls by which Congress intended to secure the peace which
is essential to all phases of our industrial life. It is proposed to consider two
representative areas in which such doctrines have developed: (1) The
doctrine of majority representation, including (a) what determines
whether an employer is obliged to bargain with the union, even though its
3 National Labor Relations Act, as amended 61 STAT. 136; 29 U.S.C. Supp.
V, §151 (1947) herein called the Act.
4 Section 8 (d) provides in part: "For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested
by either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . ,"
No attempt will be made here to discuss the proviso to section 8(d).
5 Section 8(b) (3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." Generally speaking the Board has applied the same
standards in viewing refusals to bargain by unions under section 8(b) (3) as it
has to employers under section 8(a) (5). Since the union obligation did not
exist under the Wagner Act, and this consideration involves a comparative study,
the doctrines will be discussed herein in terms of their application to employers
only.
6 By "present Board" is meant the Board as composed of Chairman Farmer
and Members Murdock, Peterson, Rodgers, and Beeson. Although Member Beeson
has been replaced by Member Leedom, the latter has not as yet participated in any
published decisions involving these principles.
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employees have not selected that union by a secret ballot election and
(b) how long the Board will compel a determination of majority to
endure without requiring a new determination of majority representation;
and (2) The doctrines which determine what specific criteria have come
to indicate compliance with the requirements of the Act.
1. MAjoRrr REPRESENTATION.
Since an employer is only obliged to deal with the representative of
its employees as defined by section 9 (a), it is essential to any situation in
which the Act attempts to control the conduct of the parties in their
bargaining that the Board determine that such a representative in fact has
been selected by a majority of the employees within an appropriate unit.
A. When a majority determination may be made in the
absence of a secret ballot election.
At the outset it must be understood that the Board may determine
what, if any, union represents a majority of the employees of an employer
in an appropriate unit in two different proceedings, depending upon how
the case arises. If a union seeks to be certified as a majority representative,
the Board acts through a representation proceeding, pursuant to section 9
of the Act. On the other hand the Board must, in a proceeding in which
an employer is alleged to have refused to bargain in violation of section 8
(a) (5), determine whether or not the union in fact is the representative
of such employees within the meaning of section 9 (a).
Prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board could make a
majority determination in a representation proceeding, upon the filing of a
petition by a union, by any means it chose, including a check of author-
ization cards against the employer's payroll, an election, or by any other
means it felt appropriate. 7 When the Wagner Act was amended, how-
ever, an election became mandatory as a means of determining employee
representatives in a proceeding under section 9 (c). However, section 9
(a) remained unchanged insofar as is pertinent to this discussion. Yet
section 8 (a) (5) requires only that the representative with whom an
employer is obliged to bargain under that section be a representative within
the meaning of section 9 (a). This has resulted in a situation where the
Board may compel an employer to bargain with a union as majority
representative on the basis of a determination made by some means other
than a secret ballot election that it is indeed the representative of a majority
of the employees in an appropriate unit.
Accordingly, many representation proceedings potentially could
7Section 9(c) provided: '" . . Whenever a question affecting commerce
arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such
controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the
representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation,
the Boaxd shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in
conjunction with a proceeding under section 10 or otherwise, and may take
a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain
such representatives."
1955]
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constitute refusals to bargain in violation of section 8 (a) (5), since in
many representation cases the employer has refused to bargain with a
union which is seeking certification and, of course, recognition, without
such a determination by the Board. On an administrative basis the Board
requires that the union submit evidence that it has been designated by only
thirty percent of the employees in such unit in order to have the Board
investigate to the end that it will direct an election. However, as a practi-
cal matter in many, many cases the petitioning union has in its possession
cards designating it to.represent them signed by over a majority of the
employees in the unit. Accordingly, it would be possible for almost every
representation case to present a set of facts in which the employer by
refusing to recognize the union without a certification is, in fact, in techni-
cal violation of section 8 (a) (5).
Even under the Wagner Act the Jboard had, on occasion, refused to
find a violation of section 8 (5) of that Act where the facts led it to
believe that the employer's insistence on an election was a good faith
request for reasonable proof of the union's majority status although the
employer refused to consent to an election, even where there existed
interference by supervisors violative of section 8 (1).' As a practical
matter the board has long recognized the superiority of a secret ballot
election as a means of determining whether the employees do in fact want
to be represented by one or another union and has characterized union
authorization cards as a notoriously unreliable method of determining
majority status of a union. The number of duplicate signatures submitted
by competing unions to support the showing of interest required when
there is competition between two or more unions to represent employees
shows that employees will sign cards designating a representative which
may not be their real choice if they were casting a secret ballot.'
Accordingly, the Board has permitted employers to demand an
election to prove the majority status of a union, with certain limitations,
in a doctrine now known as the Artcraft Hosiery or Joy Silk doctrine
because of the cases in which it was first enunciated. Under this doctrine
an employer may question a union's majority and not be obliged to
bargain until its majority status has been proved in a secret ballot election,
provided, as the Board puts it, the employer is motivated by a good faith
doubt as to the union's 'majority representation. The Board spelled this
doctrine out in Artcraft Hosiery Co.,"0 when it said:
We have held, and still hold, that an employer may in
good faith insist on a Board election as proof of the union's
majority but that an -employer unlawfully refuses to bargain if
its insistence on such an election is motivated, not by any bona
8 Chamberlain Cooperative, 75 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1948). See also Roanoke Public
Warehouse, 72 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1947).
9 Sunbeam Corporation, 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 550 (1952); Midwest Piping and
Supply Company, Inc., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945).
1
o 78 N.L.R.B. 333, 334 (1948).
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fide doubt as to the union's majority, but rather by a rejection
of the collective bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time
within which to undermine the Union... . The crucial issue
in these cases is the Employer's motive at the time of the refusal
to bargain. Whether in a particular case an employer is acting
in good or bad faith, is of course a question Which of necessity
must be determined 'in the light of all the relevant facts in the
case.' Among the factors pertinent to a determination of the
employer's motive at the time of the refusal to bargain are any
unlawful conduct of the employer..., the sequence of events,
and the lapse of time between the refusal and the unlawful
conduct.
Notwithstanding the "good faith" limits set forth in this case on
the circumstances under which an employer would be accorded the
privilege of having an election before he need accept the majority claim
of a union, the Board in many subsequent cases appeared to find that,
notwithstanding the rationale set forth in the Artcraft Hosiery case, an
employer could insist upon an election when confronted by a claim of
union recognition, but only so long as he did not engage in any other
violation of the Act. Wherever there existed any conduct such as dis-
criminatory discharges, speeches or statements to employees which it
regarded as violations of other sections of the Act, or any unilateral acts
on the part of the employer without negotiation with the union, it would
not permit the employer to insist upon an election if there was evidence
that a majority of the employees in a unit had signed union authorization
cards. The Board then based a majority finding on such cards, and
required the employer to bargain with the union without an election,
concluding that the commission of such acts cast doubt on the employer's
good faith in questioning the majority. See, for example, Joy Silk Mills,
Incororated,1 wherein the Board reversed its trial examiner and found
that the employer there involved did not have a good faith doubt as to the
union's majority, but was motivated "rather by a rejection of the collective
bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which to undermine
the union", citing the Artcraft case. This doctrine found support in the
courts when the Joy Silk Mills case was enforced. 2 To be sure, court
approval of this doctrine would of necessity be almost universal, because
it depended upon the limited issue of whether there was substantial evi-
dence to support the Board's factual finding that the employer had no
11 85 N.LR.B. 1263 (1949).
12Joy Silk Mills v. NLRB, 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.) (1950), cert. den.
341 U.S. 914. See also NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F. 2d 420
(C.A. 4) (1951); NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8 (C.A. 1) (1951); NLRB v.
W. T. Grant, 199 F. 2d 711 (C.A. 9) (1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 928; NLRB v.
Epstein, 203 F. 2d 482 (C.A. 3) (1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 912; NLRB v. Howell
Chevrolet Co., 204 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 9) (1953), aff'd. 346 U.S. 482 (1953); Smith
Transfer Co. v. NLRB, 204 F. 2d 738 (C.A. 5); NLRB v. Stewart, 207 F.
2d 8 (C.A. 5) (1953); NLRB v. Stow Manufacturing Co., 217 F. 2d 900
(C.A. 2) (1954).
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good faith doubt as to the union's majority. Particularly where an em-
ployer refused to consent to an election was the Board inclined to conclude
that its asserted doubt as to the union's majority status was not advanced
in good faith. Houston and North Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc.
13
In that case, the trial examiner, in finding a lack of good faith doubt,
had relied on a case which pre-dated the Artcraft Hosiery and Joy Silk
Mills statements of Board policy and which placed a much heavier
burden on the employer. Rockwood Stove Works.14 In the Rockwood
case the Board had stated: "It is also clearly established in decisions of
the Board and the courts too numerous to cite, that where a labor organ-
ization represents a majority of employees in an appropriate unit, and
advises the employer of that fact and makes a reasonable offer of proof
of the said majority, the employer, unless there are extenuating circum-
stances such as claims by a rival union, may not lawfully withhold recog-
nition and refuse to bargain on the grounds that the said labor organiza-
tion has not been formally certified with the Board." In effect this placed
on the employer the burden of showing "extenuating circumstances" when
it sought an election as a condition to bargaining.
The Board continued to find that so-called "per se" violations by
the unilateral granting of wage increases or violations by interrogation of
employees denied an employer the privilege of having an election. In
W. T. Grant Co.,'5 the Board stated: "There would have been. nothing
unlawful in the respondent's insistence upon a Board election if it had
been motivated by a genuine doubt that the Union represented a majority
of its employees. However, we cannot find that this was the case." cf.
Celanese Corporation of America."6 Yet by 1951 the Board consisting
of Herzog, Houston, and Murdock, decided that an employer was not in
violation of section 8 (a) (5) where it stated:
"As we have frequently held,4 an employer who, in good
faith, questions the majority status of a union which demands
recognition as the bargaining representative of his employees,
may lawfully insist that the union prove its majority in a
Board-conducted election. But if, in insisting upon an election,
the employer is motivated, not by a bona fide doubt as to the
union's majority standing, but by a rejection of the collective
bargaining principle or a desire to gain time in Which to under-
mine the union, the demand for an election is no defense to a
refusal-to-bargain charge, if the union in fact represented the
majority of employees in an appropriate unit at the time of the
refusal to bargain."
,,4 New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 604; Art-
craft Hosiery Company, 78 NLRB 333.""l1
13 88 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1950).
1463 N.L.R.B. 1297, 1325 (1945).
15 94 N.L.R.B. 1133, 1134 (1951), 199 F. 2d 711 (1952), cert. den. 344 U.S.
928 (1952).
1695 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), Members Houston and Murdock, dissenting
17 Beaver Machine & Tool Co., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 33, 34 (1951).
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In the Beaver case the Board concluded that it was not convinced
that the respondent employer was acting in bad faith in insisting on an
election, even though it had previously engaged in unfair labor practices
by interfering with an employees' association and had subsequently com-
mitted a violation of section 8 (a) (1) by a foreman's warning to an
employee. The Board held "its unlawful conduct was not of such a
character or extent as to establish that its refusal to bargain without an
election was based, as the Trial Examiner found, on a desire to avoid
recognizing and dealing with an outside union unless compelled to do so,
rather than on an actual good faith doubt as to the Union's majority."
However, in that case another labor organization "was apparently still
functioning as the employees' bargaining representative" (p. 35 n. 5).
Nevertheless, in many instances the existence of other conduct,
before or after an employer refused recognition without an election,
which constituted even a technical violation of the Act has been held to
establish lack of good faith in requiring an election.'" Yet a majority of
the Board refused to find that the employer's doubt was not bona fide
where, after the union's request for a consent Election was agreed to,
the employer engaged in violations of section 8 (a)(1) and discharged
an employee in violation of section 8 (a)(3) of the Act, 9 a case which
presaged a more limited application of the doctrine which was developing
into a fiction whereby a demand for an election together with any
violation, albeit unrelated in causal significance, was regarded as re-
butting the good faith of the demand.
After Chairman Guy Farmer was appointed to the Board, on July
13, 1953, the first case in which he was called upon to apply the .4rtcraft
doctrine indicated that his point of view differed sharply from that of the
remaining Board members. When in August, 1953, the Board issued its
decision in Broum Truck and Trailer Manufacturing Company, Inc.,2 °
the difference of opinion became apparent. The trial examiner had found
a refusal to bargain and determined that the employer had not advanced
in good faith its doubt as to the union's majority under circumstances
where the employer had closed its plant and transferred its operations to
another town. When approached by the union, it questioned the union's
majority. Because the company failed to disclose its impending move to
the union, the trial examiner found that its question as to the union's
majority was not advanced in good faith, although when originally
called upon to recognize the union the employer had consented to an
election. Because the employer had conveyed the impression that it was
going out of business, the election was postponed. After the employer
moved its operations, the union filed charges which the trial examiner
18 e.g. Southern Pine Electric Cooperative, 104 N.L.R.B. 834 (1953), enforced
218 F. 2d 824 (C.A. 5).
19 Glass Fiber Moulding Company, 104 N.L.R.B. 383 (1953), Members
Houston and Styles dissenting.
20 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
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and the Board sustained. Chairman Farmer, in his dissent, refused to
concur in finding a union majority based upon anything other than an
election, stating that the Board has acknowledged that authorization cards
were an unreliable method of determining the majority status of the
union. He said:
Because of this fact and the ready availability of the
Board's election machinery to determine the majority issue,
the Board has turned more and more to the use of the secret
ballot as the most conclusive and satisfactory method for deter-
mining whether or not a union's claim to majority status is well
founded.
Acknowledging that as a matter of law an election is not necessary to
establish the majority, he nevertheless stated:
But I am of the opinion that reliance upon such secondary
evidence-demonstrably less dependable than a secret ballot
election--should be limited to extraordinary circumstances such
as where the employer has, in an effort to avoid his obligations
under the statute, engaged in unlawfuA conduct dissipating the
union's membership and making it impossible to hold a free and
uncoerced election. (Emphasis supplied.)
Again on August 26, 1953, in Southeastern Rubber Manufacturing
Co., Inc.,2 Chairman Farmer dissented, where the union had agreed to
the holding of an election to determine its majority but lost 6 to 13.
Once more Farmer condemned the reliability of membership cards as
indicating the wishes of the employees, stating, "It is for this basic reason
that the statute provides for Government-supervised tests of the em-
ployees' choice, and it seems to me plain that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, we ought not to substitute a doubtful test for a con-
clusive one" (p. 994). The conduct of the employer on which the
majority of the Board based its doubt as to his good faith was limited to
the conduct of two company officials in interrogating some employees
individually concerning how they felt about the union.
It was therefore not surprising when on October 29, 1953, in the
Walmac Company (Radio Station KMAC and KISS), the Board
(Member Murdock did not participate) announced a more definite limita-
tion on the circumstances under which it would deny an employer the
right to insist upon an election. The trial examiner had required bargain-
ing without an election on the basis of authorization cards signed by six
out of seven employees in the unit involved. The employer, on advice of
counsel, had insisted upon a hearing when union representatives asked him
to agree to a consent election. The union's representative thereupon
proferred the signed cards to the employer who declined to inspect them.
The Board reversed the trial examiner and found that there was no
evidence that the employer had not in good faith doubted the union's
21106 N.L.R.B. 989 (1953).
22 106 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1953).
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majority in the absence of an election, reciting that apparently it was the
theory of the trial examiner that the employer's bad faith in insisting
upon an election stemmed solely from the fact that it had granted a few
raises unilaterally subsequent to the request for recognition. It stated:
Apparently, it is the theory of the Trial Examiner that
in any situation where a union claims, but is denied, recognition
as majority representative and the employer commits any form
of unfair labor practice, ipso facto, the employer also thereby
violates Section 8 (a) (5). We cannot agree with this principle,
and past Board decisions do not support it."3 The Board set
forth the current version of its doctrine to be as follows:
Apart from the obvious fact that the scheme of the Act
never contemplated that a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) should
automatically constitute a violation of Section 8 (a)(5), there
are facts in this case which point strongly to the rejection of
any principle such as the Trial Examiner's.3 There is no direct
proof that the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union
in the absence of a regular election was motivated by anything
other than a doubt as to majority status. . . . The complaint
therefore was predicated upon the theory that an employer who
puts a claiming union to the test of a Board-ordered election
runs the risk of automatically being ordered to bargain with
that union-without an election to test its status-if the em-
ployer changes the working conditions of a few employees ...
We are unable to reach the conclusion reached by the
General Counsel that the Respondent chose to insist upon a
Board-ordered election-which normally is its right-because
it was in bad faith motivated by an intention unlawfully to
refuse to bargain with their chosen representative.
3Harcourt and Company, 98 N.L.R.B. 892 at 900-901.
This principle was applied later to a situation where without an
election an employer refused to recognize a union and thereafter violated
section 8 (a)(2) of the Act by dominating and interfering with an
employee's committee.24 Such conduct, the Board found, did not per se
violate Section 8 (a) (5), since the employer's behavior, both before and
after its refusal to recognize the union, despite the sponsorship of the
committee, did not negate its good faith doubt as to the union's majority
status at the time of the latter's demand for recognition.
Even before the Walmac case, the Board had, on occasion, refused
to find bad faith in insistence on an election even where the employer
subsequently had engaged in unilateral acts, such as granting merit and
general wage increases, without consulting with the union. Thus, where
a company had an established policy of insisting upon elections and not
agreeing to consent elections, even though the union representatives had
23 Citing Beaver Machine & Tool Co., Inc., 97 N.L1LB. 33 (1951) and I.
Spiewok & Sons, 71 N.L.R.B. 770 (1947).24 Poe Machine & Engineering Company, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1954).
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displayed their designation cards to representatives of the employer, the
trial examiner refused to find that "the Respondent had abandoned its
policy or lost its right to demand certification" since he found this "would
be to place a premium on a technicality, especially since there is no
evidence of bad faith on the Respondent's part."'2
Prior to the Goodrich case, the refusal to consent to an election
had been regarded as a very significant point in determining whether or
not the employer had exhibited good faith doubt in insisting upon an
election.2
6
Since the Walmac case the Board has, in general, followed the
doctrine as established there, although it has varied it to some extent in
regard to the strictness with which it has viewed other acts on the part
of an employer as indicative of its bad faith in insisting upon an election.
Thus, an employer's doubt as to a union's majority and the unit it sought
was held not to have been expressed in good faith where a certification
was insisted upon by its supervisor in charge of labor relations for the
area, but a store manager had engaged in threats in violation of section 8
(a) (1), on the ground that the employer could not have been motivated
by a good faith doubt because "while one agent of the Respondent was
insisting upon an election, another was engaging in an extensive series of
unfair labor practices calculated to undermine the Union's majority". 2 7
This is in contrast to its decision in Blue Flash Express, Icorporated,2 s
where, even though an employer interviewed employees and questioned
them individually as to whether they had signed union cards, the Board
found that the questioning was not a violation of section 8 (a) (1) and
did not cast doubt on the good faith motive of the employer in questioning
the union's majority.
In determining the good faith of an employer's doubt as to a
union's alleged majority, the board considers other conduct of the em-
ployer which may reveal his motive in challenging the union's status.
The board professes that whether such conduct of the employer con-
stitutes a violation of some additional section of the act is not controlling
upon it in reaching determinations as to his bona fides in refusing to accord
recognition to the union upon its assertion of majority representation.
Yet it is apparent that the Board's changing policies in regard to violations
of section 8 (a) (1) do influence whether an employer's insistence upon
an election as proof of majority will be regarded as advanced in good
25 B. F. Goodrich Company, 106 N.L.R.B. 757 (1953). A panel consisting of
Members Murdock, Styles, and Peterson adopted his Intermediate Report and
dismissed the complaint without a decision.
26 e.g. Clearfield Cheese Company, 106 N.L.R.B. 417 (1953) and cases
cited in the Intermediate Report therein at p. 440; but see cases cited by dissent
in Glass Fiber case, supra, at p. 387, note 10.
27 Safeway Stores, Incorporated, 110 N.L.R.B. 242 (1954), see also Idaho
Egg Producers, III N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1955).
28 109 N.L.R.B. 85 (1954).
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faith. For example, an employer has been denied the right to insist upon
an election as proof of majority where his employees were threatened and
questioned by supervisors and the employer authorized and sponsored an
anti-union petition in violation of section 8 (a) (1) and the threat was
made almost at precisely the time when the employer was refusing the
union's bargaining request, even though the employer consented to the
holding of an election.
29
Again, in Wheeling Pipeline, Inc.,30 released January 22, 1955, the
Board adopted, without comment, an intermediate report recommending
a finding of an 8 (a) (5) violation in view of the trial examiner's con-
clusion that the employer did not in fact have a good faith doubt as to
the union's majority, where shortly before his refusal the employer had
discharged an employee for union activity and supervisory employees had
engaged in interrogation of and threats directed against employees and
one supervisor had stated that the company would never recognize the
union. See also Ben Corson Manufacturing Co., where other unfair
labor practices by an employer were held to have defeated the right to an
election. It is clear, however, that the present Board requires substantial,
not technical, violations of other sections of the Act to impune the good
faith of an employer in demanding an election.
Chairman Farmer dissented from the Board's decision in the
Taylor-O'Brien case,"' released on April 6, 1955, insofar as its findings
were contrary to the recommendations of the trial examiner. It is inter-
esting to note that his dissent does not refer to the Brown or Southeastern
cases, supra, but relies solely on the weight to be accorded the trial
examiner's findings. It may be that the Walmac principle, as it has
subsequently been applied, meets the objections Chairman Farmer origi-
nally advanced as to authorization cards as proof of a union's majority.
Although there are pre-Taft-Hartley amendment cases which antici-
pate the rationalization which underlies the A1rtcraft doctrine, 2 it was not
necessary to rely on such a doctrine heavily until the amendments to the
Act, since even in representation proceedings, prior to the amendments,
the union's majority could be determined by some means other than an
election. When, however, Congress proscribed the determination of a
majority in representation proceedings by anything other than an election,
the Board reached a point where it looked more charitably at an employer's
29Taylor-O'Brien Corporation, 112 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1955); but see A. L.
Gilbert Company, 110 N.L.R.B. No. 231 (1954), where a majority of the Board,
consisting of Farmer, Rodgers, and Beeson found no violation of section 8(a) (5)
despite the conduct of polls by the employer; cf. Pryne Moulding Corp., 110
N.L.R.B. No. 240 (1954), where the Board found a "lack of sincerity" on the
employer's part because of other subsequent unfair labor practices.
30 U1 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1955). See Ben Corson Manufacturing Co. 112
N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1955).
31 See note 29, supra.
32 See the Chamberlain Cooperative, supra; Roanoke Public Warehouse, 72
N.L.R.B. 1281 (1947) (Houston dissenting).
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insistence on one. But after the Artcraft doctrine was enunciated, as noted
above, there arose a number of cases in which in an arbitrary and automatic
fashion the employer was denied the right to demand an election if there
existed, either before or after his insistence, any conduct on the part
of a supervisor which might be regarded as a violation of any other section
of the Act. The Walmac case was to remedy this. While Chairman
Farmer's dissents in the Brown and Southeast n cases indicated that he
would take a more extreme stand against upholding findings of majorities
in section 8 (a) (5) cases made on any evidence other than elections,
nevertheless the Walmac decision appears to have resulted in a sufficient
compromise of the Artcraft doctrine to have met with his approval. Until
other factors or changing Board personnel alter the situation, it would
appear that that case and its subsequent interpretations set forth the current
state of the Board's thinking on this subject.
To what extent the changes in the economic atmosphere promulgated
by the 1947 amendments, rather than the amendment of section 9, in-
fluenced the difference in Board thinking displayed between the Rockwood
and Artcraft decisions would be speculative. Chairman Farmer's dissents
in the Brown Truck and Southeastern Rubber cases appear to be based
primarily upon a personal distrust of the unreliability of card majorities.
Hence, the Walmac doctrine as presently applied would seem to stem
more from the advancing experience of the collective Board in the realities
of industrial relations in the light of a developing maturity on the part
of employers and unions in accepting the controls imposed by the Act than
from other causes.
It is to be observed that although the decisions do not stress this
consideration, the real significance of this doctrine is its effect on the right
of the employees to express their choice and not to have a bargaining
representative imposed upon them without the ability to resort to a secret
ballot. It has been properly held that it ill behooves an employer who has
violated the Act to plead on behalf of the rights of his employees, par-
ticularly where his conduct has prevented the election from disclosing
their choice freely.8" However, the Board has adequate machinery for
controlling the timing of an election and compelling its conduct in an
atmosphere free of coercion. To have a majority determined, because of
the errors of an employer, on the basis of anything but a fair and secret
election does not appear, in the public interest, to solve this problem.
B. Loss OF MAJORITY
The second line of Board decisions in which some significant doctrines
have evolved concerning the determination of majority representatives has
to do with the duration of majority determinations and has at last achieved
some stability through the decision of the Supreme Court on December 6,
33 See Brooks case, infra; see also Ben Corson Manufacturing Co., 112
N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1955).
[Vol. 16
THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
1954, in Brooks v. N.L.R.B."4 The decisional variation which occurred
in these doctrines was not attributable to the Board but to the courts. The
Board has been uniformly consistent in its position on these doctrines from
the start. The Supreme Court in the Brooks case set forth the "working
rules" which it found that the Board had evolved in exercising its authority
under the Wagner Act to certify a union as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the bargaining unit when it had determined that the
union commanded majority support as follows:
(a) A certification, if based on a Board-conducted
election, must be honored for a 'reasonable' period, ordinarily
"one year" in the absence of "unusual circumstances" . . .
(b) "Unusual circumstances" were found in at least
three situations: ... (1) the certified union dissolved or became
defunct; . . . (2) as a result of a schism, substantially all the
members and officers of the certified union transferred their
affiliation to a new local or international; . . . (3) the size of
the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a short time....
(c) Loss of majority support after the 'reasonable' period
could be questioned in two ways: (1) employer's refusal to
bargain, or (2) petition by a rival union for a new election....
(d) If the initial election resulted in a majority for a
"no union", the election-unlike a certification-did not bar a
second election within a year. 3
The Brooks case involved a situation where immediately after an
election and without any instigation by the employer a group of employees
repudiated the secret ballot vote and sought to withdraw from the union.
The Supreme Court decision clearly established the validity of the Board's
one-year rule in regard to the duration of certifications. The result is
that where there has been an election and a certification the Board will
not permit an employer during that period to avoid bargaining with the
certified representative even though it has reasonable grounds to believe
that the certification no longer represents the employees' choice. This is
doubtless a sound administrative rule. Congress, not the Board, has made
this rule less inflexible. The Board originally presumed a continued ma-
jority in a certified representative for a reasonable period, ordinarily a
year, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.& However, the
Taft-Hartley amendments made it impossible for the Board to conduct a
second election within one year. Therefore, even if extraordinary cir-
cumstances exist, the Board is without power to hold a re-determination of
representatives on a formal basis.
The more difficult problems arise in connection with situations where
there has been no formal certification. As we have seen, both before and
34 Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
31 35 L.R.R.M. 2158-2159.
36 See Wells Dairies Cooperative 111 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1955), wherein
the Trial Examiner traces the consistent history of the Board's policy in this regard.
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after the 1947 amendments, the Board has been authorized in cases in-
volving allegations of refusal to bargain in violation of section 8 (a) (5)
to determine that a union represents employees by some means other than
an election. Where such a determination has been made and an employer
has been obliged to bargair with the union, the question arises as to
whether and under what circumstances it can refrain from continued
bargaining or continued recognition on the ground that changed circum-
stances have negated the majority determination previously made.
Where unfair labor practices have followed the determination there
has been no real problem. On April 10, 1944, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the Board in its position in two cases." Both those cases were
decided at a time when the Board could, by certification proceedings or
otherwise, determine the majority status of the union without the conduct
of an election. In each case a majority of employees had designated a
union to represent them without an election. In the Franks case, by the
time the complaint had issued alleging that the employer had refused to
bargain in good faith, the employees had indicated their desire to withdraw
from the union. In the Medo Photo case, the employees had withdrawn
from the union before the first bargaining conference was set. In both
cases, the Board had found that conduct on the part of the respective em-
ployers had resulted in the employees' withdrawal of their authorizations
of the union. Under those circumstances the Court held that the employer
could not avoid bargaining, despite the fact that the employees had
repudiated their designations, attributing such repudiation to the employers'
conduct.
Where the determination of majority has been based upon a cer-
tification, even after a year, the employer must have reasonable grounds
for believing that the union has lost its majority if it is to be relieved of its
obligation to bargain further." In that case, there had been a lapse of
three years since the union's certification. The Board concluded that the
question as to whether the employer had violated section 8 (a) (5) de-
pended not on whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption of the union's continuing majority status or to demonstrate that
the union in fact did not represent the majority of the employees, but
upon whether the employer in good faith believed that the union no longer
represented the majority of the employees.39 It will be noted that this
is the same test which the Board, has applied in determining whether an
employer in the first instance may question the union's majority in the
absence of a formal determination of its representative status by an
election. Today, however, in the absence of a prior refusal to bargain,
an employer can properly, at the end of the certification year, if a decer-
tification petition is filed by its employees requesting a re-determination of
37 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678 (1943) and Franks
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
38 Celanese Corporation of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
39 See also Squirrel Brand Co., Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 289 (1953).
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the union's representative status, question the union's continued status
and avoid further bargaining.4 ° Accordingly, although the Supreme
Court in the Brooks case stated: "The Board has on several occasions
intimated that even after the certification year has passed, the better
practice is for an employer with doubts to keep bargaining and petition the
Board for a new election or other relief" [citing cases], it would appear
that the current position of the Board is that after a certification year the
tests for good faith doubt as to the union's continued majority are not
unlike those which justify the employer questioning the union's repre-
sentative status initially under the A4rtcraft Hosiery doctrine referred to
above.
Where there has been no bargaining between the parties until after
the entry of a court decree enforcing the Board's order, the Board has,
without regard to the date of the certification, if any, refused to entertain
decertification petitions until it is satisfied that there has been bargaining
in good faith in compliance with the decree."
A final problem as to the duration of a majority is presented by
those cases where the majority determination was not based upon an elec-
tion and where there have been no subsequent unfair labor practices. The
question here is whether the same presumptive duration is to be attributed
to a Board order directing an employer to bargain with a union as to a
formal certification. The "reasonable time" rule has been applied to
Board orders in the absence of a prior certification, and even to settlement
agreements.4 2
In the Brooks case, the Supreme Court rejected a contention by the
employer that since a bargaining agency may be ascertained by methods
less formal than a supervised election, informal repudiation should also
be sanctioned where decertification by another election is precluded by
the one-year rule. The Supreme Court concluded: "This is to make situ-
ations that are different appear the same." Notwithstanding this summary
rejection of the contention by the Court, there are, as a consideration of
the developments of the doctrines recited above discloses, some very diffi-
cult questions presented by the changing position of the Board in regard
to when (1) an employer may properly question a union's majority
without an election, and (2) when an employer or individual employees,
for that matter, may subsequently have the question of the union's con-
tinued majority reconsidered. This is especially true if the Board has
determined that the union represents the majority by some means other
than an election.
40American Laundry Machine Company, 107 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1954).
4' See Aldora Mills, Case No. 10-RD-78, decided February 23, 1951 (un-
reported) ; West Texas Utilities Co., Case No. 16-RD-76, decided December 12,
1951 (unreported). These cases are not usually reported because they arise by the
administrative dismissals of petitions for elections.
42 See Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N.L.R.B., 192 F. 2d 740 (1952),
cert. den. 342 U. S. 954 (1952).
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In short, as to the Board doctrines in regard to the presumption of
continued majority, the original rule was that it would 'be presumed that
a majority once established (whether by a certification or by a Board
order) would continue for i reasonable time, usually to be regarded as
one year. The amendments in 1947, by precluding the Board's holding
more than one election in a year, resulted in its having to tighten that rule
insofar as certifications were concerned. 3 The question of how long a
majority will be presumed to continue either beyond the certification year,
or in the absence of a certification, where there has been good faith bar-
gaining pursuant to a Board order or court decree, is one which has to be
decided on individual facts. It therefore will probably result in varying
determinations, not unlike those which we have seen result under the
doctrines for determining whether an employer may initially question
the union's claim of majority representation in the absence of an election.
There appears to be little correlation 'between the changing personnel
of the Board or political or other non-legal factors and the evolution and
application of the Board's doctrines on the duration of the obligation to
bargain without a redetermination of representatives. The Board's in-
sistence on stability, especially following a certification, has a sound ad-
ministrative basis. Nor can there be any quarrel with its refusal to permit
an employer, by its illegal acts, to dissipate a majority once established.
On the other hand, from a practical management point of view it is
preposterous to force an employer and his employees to deal with each
other through a representative which the employees do not want.
Despite Board orders or court decrees, realistic unions often Xbandon
such situations. It is to be hoped that, in the absence of unfair labor
practices by the employer, and in the absence of a formal certification,
the Board may become more realistic in permitting the questioning of
a union's majority and permitting redeterminations without regard to
requirements 'based on arbitrary periods of time.
II. GOOD FAITH BARGAINING: CRITERIA FOR "PER SE" VIOLATIONS.
As Board doctrines developed regarding the conduct which was
required on the part of employers to meet their obligation to bargain, the
concept of "good faith" in collective -bargaining arose, although the words
themselves do not appear in the Wagner Act. An outright refusal to
meet and negotiate concerning any subject within the broad area of
"rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment," the scope of collective bargaining as set forth in section 9 (a) of
the Act, was of course held to be a violation of the Act.44 Such a refusal
was regarded as a refusal to bargain per se without regard to good faith
on the employer's part.
43 Brooks case, supra note 33. But see Oliver Machinery Corp., 102 N.LR.B.
822 (1953), where certifications followed by illegal contracts were held to raise
no presumption.
44 As noted above, the gradual process whereby the Board interpreted what
subjects came within this area cannot be covered by this paper. The main con-
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Furthermore, the Board reached the conclusion that it was a refusal
to bargain per se if an employer unilaterally initiated, terminated, or
modified any change in wages, hours, or other conditions of employment
within the Board's broad interpretation of the scope of that phrase, once
its employees had designated a bargaining representative, without first
bargaining about the matter with such representative. Thereafter any
unilateral act by an employer in this broad area came to be regarded as a
refusal to bargain per se without regard to his good faith.
But where employers purported to negotiate as the Act requires,
the Board was soon called upon to look behind the shams of purported
bargaining and this meant determining whether the whole course of
conduct of the employer displayed true bargaining, or as the Board put it,
good faith bargaining. When the 1947 amendments were adopted, the
Act for the first time defined collective bargaining, when it said:
. . . For the purposes of this section, to bargain col-
lectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such ob-
ligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession. .... 45
Obviously the entire factual picture in a given situation contributes
to the determination of whether good faith has been displayed. Yet,
as the volume of decisions grew, there appeared a tendency to extract
elements from prior decisions which became criteria for the presence or
absence of good faith bargaining, regardless of the context in which they
appeared.
In short, the Board came to regard an employer as having refused
to bargain without reference to his good faith where certain elements
troversies involved whether so-called "fringe benefits" such as merit increases,
pensions, profit-sharing, and so forth were included in this phrase and these were
resolved in a series of decisions including NLRB v. Allison & Co., 165 F.
2d 766 (C.A. 6) (1948), cert den. 395 U.S. 814, rehearing denied 335 U.S. 905.
(merit wage increases) and Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247, 250-251
(C.A. 7) (1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 960 (retirement or pension plan). The only
significant recent issue in this area has involved the bargainability of stock pur-
chase plans. In Richfield Oil Corporation, 110 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1954), the Board
found that unilateral action by an employer's adoption of a stock purchase plan
was a violation of the Act. Member Beeson issued a vigorous dissent from this
position. In view of the precedent well established before this issue was presented
to the Board, it would have been impossible for it to have reached any other
conclusion. In short, the Board's plenary interpretation of the scope of collective
bargaining has met with wide success in the courts and is no longer a significant
issue.
4 5 Section 8(d).
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appeared which it regarded as "per se" violations including (1) the
express or implied refusal to bargain regarding any subject within the
broad scope which the Board has held that phrase to cover; (2) unilateral
acts on the part of the employdr with reference to any such subject; and
(3) certain types of conduct such as the refusal to sign a written contract
or the refusal to furnish information to the union, and so forth.
Many of these elements were originally considered as part of
factual complexes which showed, when taken together, the absence of
true good faith in bargaining. But some of them came to be considered
absolute criteria of "per se" refusals to bargain. It would appear that
the current trend is to look at the surrounding circumstances rather than
judge these factors in the absolute. We shall examine some of these
elements or criteria to discover how policy trends have developed in this
area.
A. Refusals to bargain on compulsory subjects.
Wherever any subject falls within the scope of compulsory bar-
gaining, the Board has held the refusal to discuss such subject to be
violative of the Act, regardless of the employer's motive in contending
that it was a subject for the unilateral determination of management,
on the theory that the "requisites of good faith bargaining cannot be
found to exist when the lack of a legal requirement to bargain is upper-
most in the [employer's] mind."4 This was the position of the Board
throughout the development of its policies regarding "fringe" benefits
referred to in note 43. But it went further and held that the withholding
of any subject within the scope of compulsory bargaining for the unilateral
determination of management was not a bargainable issue. However,
the Supreme Court put an end to this in 1952 when it reversed the
Board's decision in American National Insurance Company 47 sustaining
a decision of the Fifth Circuit which held that an employer might properly
refuse to enter into a contract unless the union agreed to a broad "manage-
ment prerogative" clause retaining to the sole determination of manage-
ment numerous matters clearly within the scope of compulsory
bargaining.48
While an outright refusal to discuss such a subject is doubtless still
a "per se" refusal to bargain in the Board's eyes, it has come to be much
more realistic about looking to the good faith of the entire negotiations
before basing a violation solely on an insistence to withhold certain sub-
jects from bilateral determination. 4' The Board has finally come to look
46 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 857 (1951), enforced 205 F. 2d
131 (1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 887 (1954).
47 89 N.L.R.B. 185 (1950).
48 NLRB v. American National Insurance Company, 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
49 For instance, while grievances are clearly within the area of compulsory
bargaining, see United States Gypsum Co., 94. N.L.R.B. 112 (1951) the refusal
to agree to arbitration is no longer a violation of section 8(a) (5) per se.
Harcourt & Co., Inc., 9$ N.L.R.B. 892 (1952); Old Line Insurance Co., 96 N.L.R.B.
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at the substance rather than the surface of an employer's "refusal to
negotiate" concerning various subjects when the employer "was not an
experienced negotiator" and obviously meant he would not "agree" to
the union's proposals."0
Even after the American National Insurance decision, the Board
appeared reluctant to interpret the Supreme Court's decision as inclusively
as its broad language seemed to imply."1 For example, in Dixie Corpo-
ration 2 an employer was again found to have violated section 8 (a) (5)
inter alia by insisting on a broad management prerogative clause. The
present Board has not been called upon to decide any close cases involving
whether and in what manner bargainable subjects may -be contractually
waived as matters for joint union-management participation. Since
questions involving the scope of collective bargaining will not be apt to
reappear--employers are not even questioning that "guaranteed annual
wage" is within the scope of compulsory bargaining---decisions in this
area will probably be confined to factual issues as to whether the pattern
of negotiations reflects "hard bargaining" or bargaining with such a
closed mind as to show lack of good faith, a field in which the ground
rules have been thoroughly laid out by now.
B. Unilateral acts as per se zsolations.
In early cases the original Board concluded that when an employer
was under an obligation to bargain it could not, consistently with that
obligation, take any unilateral action in regard to any subject covered
thereby, since to do so would serve to undermine the status of the em-
ployees' representative. Hence such action constituted a violation of
section 8 (a) (5) as well as of section 8 (a) (1), per se, without regard
to the employer's motive. Originally the Board placed no limits on its
ban on unilateral employer action. However, the Supreme Court held53
that, once a bona fide impasse had been reached in negotiations, an em-
ployer might put into effect any offers made to a union on which an
impasse had been reached, since a grant of benefits by the employer
". .. might well carry no disparagement of the collective bargaining
proceedings. Instead of being regarded as an unfair labor practice, it
might be welcomed by the bargaining representative, without prejudice to
the rest of the negotiations." But the Board was reluctant to find that
such a bona fide impasse had occurred. 4
499 (1951). See also Textron Puerto Rico, 107 N.LR.B. 583, 584- (1953);
McDonnell Aircraft, 109 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (1954); United Telephone Co., 112
N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1955).
50 The Frohman Mfg. Co., Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1954).
51 See Humphrey, The Government at the Bargaining Table, Syracuse L. Rev.,
12942 (1954).
52 105 N.L.R.B. 390, 399 (1953).
53 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 225 (1949).
54 Bradley Washfountain Company. 89 N.L.R.B. 1662 (1950); Landis Tool
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 503 (1950); Crow-Burlingame Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 997 (1951);
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951).
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By 1950 he last Board of which Herzog was chairman was con-
sistently applying this "per se" doctrine to instances of unilateral wage
raises or unilateral employer action regarding the many subjects found
by the Board to be within the field of obligatory bargaining."m This
dqctrine applied to unilateral action both during negotiations and after a
contract had been signed, unless the contract granted the right to the
employer to determine the matter unilaterally. But the Board has always
shown great reluctance to find such a waiver, which must be express.50
The "new Board" (i.e., the Farmer Board of 1954) appears more
inclined to look to the facts to determine whether unilateral action con-
stitutes a violation, and has been more reluctant to base "per se" violations
on such conduct. Where benefits were effectuated by an employer ac-
companied by a notice that they were "in accordance with the provisions
of the pending union contract" the Board refused to find this either for-
bidden unilateral conduct or evidence of bad faith." Yet where an em-
ployer, the day after an election "intensified its pre-election unfair labor
practices" by wage raises and discriminatory discharges, on the basis of the
whole picture the Board found a violation."8 A unilateral wage increase
continues to be a violation where it occurred along with other illegal
acts which "whether considered separately or in their totality .. . con-
stitute a refusal to bargain .... .
Generally, recent cases seem to reveal a healthy practice of
returning to the reasoning which led the original Board to look at all
the facts, rather than find, as did later decisions, that a unilateral act by
an employer was a violation without regard to either the motivation or
real effect of that action.
C. Other unfair labor practices as per se violations.
Another area in which employer conduct came to be regarded as
per se violative of section 8 (a) (5) was the commission by the employer
5 5 
e.g. Mason & Hughes, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 848 (1949); Dixie Culvert Mfg.
Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 554 (1949); Valley Broadcasting Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1949);
Landis Tool Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 503 (1950); U. S. Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112
(1951); Graham County Electric Cooperative, Inc., 96 N.L.LB. 1273 (1952). See
also National Labor Relations Board, Twelfth Annual Report, 1947 pp. 35-36;
Thirteenth Annual Report, 1948, p. 61; Fourteenth Annual Report, 1949, p. 78;
Fifteenth Annual Report, 1950, p. 122.
58Tide Water Associated Oil Company, 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949); The
Standard Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 227 (1950); The Jacobs Company, 94 N.L.R.B.
1214 (1951).
57 Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (1954).
58 Alexander Manufacturing Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 210 (1954); see also
White Motor Company, 111 N.L.R.B. No. 204 (1955).
5 9
.Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 216 (1954), citing Top Mode,
supra, Hallam & Hoggs Truck and Implement Co., 95 N.LR.B. 1443 (1951);
Tennessee Valley Broadcasting Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 895 (1949) note 7; and Jordan
Bus Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 717 (1954) (q.v.). See also Idaho Egg Producers, 111
N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1955) (unilaterally granting Saturdays off).
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of the violation of any other section of the Act while negotiations were
pending, without regard to the motivation or effect of such conduct.
Thus, if a supervisor made statements constituting interference in viola-
tion of section 8 (a) (1) or discharged an employee in violation of
section 8 (a) (3), this conduct was regarded as derogating from the
bona fides of the negotiations per se."u The last Herzog Board finally
held that a violation of section 8 (a) (1) was not per se a refusal to
bargain in good faith. 6 This is another place where it is to be hoped that
the Board will examine the whole picture and not automatically find
refusals to bargain 'based on fictions of bad faith stemming from other
violations of which the negotiator may have no actual knowledge.
D. Negotiation stands as per se ziolations.
It would be impossible to consider here all the standards for conduct
during negotiations which the Board has imposed in measuring whether
the statutory requirements have been met. Its attitude on some of the
positions which parties to negotiations have advanced is representative,
however.
The Supreme Court soon upheld the Board's position that a refusal
"to sign a written contract embodying the terms agreed upon . . . is a
refusal to bargain within the meaning of the Act" in Heinz Co. v.
NLRB.62 Thereafter a refusal to incorporate the provisions agreed to
in a written contract was regarded as a per se violation. Yet in a decision
by Members Rodgers and Beeson (Peterson dissenting) the Board re-
cently refused to find a refusal to execute a tentative agreement a
violation where such refusal "was not motivated by opposition to col-
lective bargaining."6 3 Likewise the failure "to incorporate existing con-
ditions of employment in a written agreement" came to be regarded as a
per se violation.64 However, the Farmer, Peterson and Rodgers Board
(Murdock dissenting) refused to find that an employer violated section 8
(a)(5) by refusing to include in a contract its own policy on military
service, albeit agreeing to abide by it. 5 Direct dealing with employees was
also regarded as a violation per se."6 This policy has not been weakened
60Prigg Boat Works, 97 N.LR.B. 290 (1951), enforced 197 F. 2d 150 (C.A. 5)
(1952); Whiting Lumber Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 265 (1951); Apex Toledo Corpora-
don, 101 N.LR.B. 807 (1952); Globe Products Corporation, 102 N.L.R.B.
278 (1953).
61 Harcourt & Co., 98 N.L!RB. 892 (1952).
02 311 U.S. 514, 523 (1941).
6 3 Milwaukee Electric Tool case, supra (1954).
(4 Gagnon Plating and Manufacturing Company, 97 N.L.R.B. 104, 107 (1951),
see also Cheney California Lumber Company, 62 N.LR.B. 1208, 1216 (1945);
J. E. Cote, 100 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1952); James C. Ellis, 102 N.L.R.B. 497, 507 (1953).
65White Motor Company, 111 N.LR.B. No. 204 (1955).
e6 U. S. Automatic Company, 57 N.L.R.B. 124, 135 (1944); Union Manu-
facturing Company, 95 N.LR.B. 792 (1951); Louisville Container Corporation,
99 N.LR.B. 81 (1952).
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by more recent decisions.67 The shifting of positions during negotiations
was at one time regarded as in itself indication of bad faith bargaining.6"
But by 1953, even Herzog, Murdock and Peterson were looking more
critically at the evidence before determining that the mere shifting of
ppsitions by an employer constituted "an act of -bad faith," 69 although
it properly remains an element to be considered in determining good faith."
But the present Board has expressly rejected "the mere shifting of positions
during bargaining by an employer" as "per se an unfair labor practice",
maintaining that the Trial Examiner had "erroneously construed certain
earlier Board decisions" as holding that.71 The Board stated:
Regardless of whether hasty or unreasonable withdrawals of
specific concessions painstakingly achieved indicate bad faith
in bargaining in a particular context, it does not follow that a
party to collective bargaining is, in all contexts, rigidly bound to
each and every tentative decision reached.
These are but examples of numerous types of conduct which were
originally viewed as elements of bad faith in negotiations, which sub-
sequently, at times, were regarded by the Board or its Trial Examiners
as per se violative of the Act, and as to which current decisions reveal a
tendency once more to establish violations only when viewed in context.
This tendency relieves the parties during negotiations of having to resort
to the "ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase" which Chief Justice
Warren recently stated should not be required to secure legal rights. 2
This development appears more likely to be attributable to greater
experience on the part of the collective Board and its agents than to
extrinsic political factors. The same may be said for certain defenses on
which employers have sought to rely in justification for conduct which
the Board would otherwise regard as a refusal to meet their obligation to
bargain.
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR EMPLOYER'S REFUSAL TO BARGAIN.
Even before the 1947 amendments imposed the obligation to bargain
in good faith on unions seeking recognition, the Board has refused to
find an employer guilty of bad faith in bargaining when the union's be-
havior justified the employer's action.7" This policy has been followed
0 7 The Stanley Works, 108 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1954). But see Harcourt & Co.
supra, and Efco Manufacturing, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1954).
68 Concordia Ice Company, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1943); Gittlin Bag
Company, 95 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1951), enforced 196 F. 2d 158 '(4th Cir. 1952);
Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Co., Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 394, 395 (1952).
69Fehr Baking Company, 104- N.L.R.B. 240, 245 (1953).
70 De Diego Taxi Cabs Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1037 (1954).
71 R. J. Oil & Refining Co., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1954).
72 Julius Emspak v. U.S., 75 Sup. Ct. 687, 690, 23 Law Week 4248, 4249
(1955).
73 Times Publishing Company, 72 NL.R.B. 676 (1947).
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in subsequent cases where the union was going through the motions of
collective bargaining with its mind hermetically sealed.74
In recent years the Board has been much more strict in requiring a
union to make a clear request for recognition in an appropriate unit, an
obligation which the Supreme Court imposed long ago.75 Thus, "a clear
and unequivocal demand for collective bargaining" is now necessary to
support a finding of a refusal to bargain.
76
The greatest change from early Board doctrine in cases involving
refusals to bargain in recent years has arisen in situations where the
misconduct of the union has not merely been held such as to rebut evidence
of the employer's bad fqith, but actually to relieve the employer of its
obligation to bargain. Thus, where a union engaged in an illegal slow-
down this "negated the existence of honest and sincere dealing in the
Union's contemporaneous request to negotiate." Hence, "the Respondent
was not required to indulge in the futile gesture of honoring the Union's
request." '77 Nor is an employer under a duty to bargain with a union
which is threatening to engage in illegal activity. 7s
An unusual defense was sustained recently on behalf of an employer
who refused to bargain with a union which had established a competitive
business enterprise in the same locality and industry as the employer's.7
CONCLUSION
To summarize recent trends on the part of the Board in evaluating
conduct which constitutes a failure to comply with the Act's compulsory
bargaining requirements, it seems clear that of late the Board has placed
much greater responsibility on the party, usually the union, which has
requested bargaining. Here again the altered stress seems to have de-
veloped from viewing the pattern of negotiations in a more realistic light,
rather than from either the 1947 amendments or subsequent political
events. The Board has come to recognize that twenty years of compulsory
recognition and bargaining have resulted in greater independence and
responsibility on the part of labor organizations. In place of the more
protective attitude towards unions displayed by the early Board in the
atmosphere of employer resistance which surrounded its first efforts to
74 The Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Company, 106 N.L.R.B. 2, 11
(1953). Cf. International Furniture Company, 106 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1953) and
American Rubber Products Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 73, 77 (1953), reversed 214- F.
2d 47 (7th Cir. 1954).
75 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
76 McCann Steel Company, 106 N.L.R.B. 41, 50 (1953), see also Klinka's
Garage, 106 N.L.R.B. 969 (1953) and cases cited in note 5; Mike Persia Chevrolet
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 377 (1953).
77 Phelps Dodge Products Corporation, 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 368 (1952).
78 Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 216 (1954) ; American Rubber
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F. 2d 47 (7th Cir. 1954).
79 Bausch & Lomb, 108 N.L.R.B. No. 213 (1954).
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enforce the Act and the legalistic interpretations of those early doctrines
made arbitrarily in some instances, by the Board under Chairman Millis,
the recent Board has come to regard unions and employers as experienced
and evenly matched contestants in contemporary negotiations. Ac-
cordingly, the responsibilities and obligations of both parties have been
imposed on that basis in current decisional policies involving the obligation
to bargain collectively created by the Act. It is to be hoped that both
management and labor organizations in their bargaining relations will
mature to a point where each recognizes not only its duties to the other,
but to the public as well. Then the need for the policing of their negoti-
ations by the government will be minimized if not obliterated.
